In 2007 Consumer Reports released, and two weeks later retracted, a flawed report on the safety of infant carseats. Analyzing data from 5,471 online auctions for carseats ending before, during and after the information was considered valid I find that (1) consumers responded to the new information, andmore interestingly-that (2) they promptly ceased to do so once it was retracted. This first finding, thanks to the random nature of the flawed ratings, demonstrates that expert advice has a causal effect on consumer demand. The second finding suggests that people's inability to willfully ignore information is not as extreme as the experimental evidence in the psychological literature would suggest.
This paper studies the consequences of the release and later retraction of new carseat safety information by analyzing a dataset of online auctions for carseats taking place before, during and after the information was considered valid. It is found that consumers promptly responded to both the initial information shock and to its retraction. For every position lost/gained in the safety ranking provided by CR, the average carseat price dropped/increased 3% (the average carseat moved 4 positions in the ranking). More surprisingly, just a couple of days after the retraction these price changes were completely eliminated. The invalidated information, in other words, no longer affected consumer behavior.
These results directly speak to two important marketing questions. The first is whether expert advice sways consumer demand. This question is typically difficult to answer convincingly because expert recommendations may be correlated with other information held by consumers, and hence an association between what experts recommend and what consumers do should not be interpreted causally. The fact that CR provided wrong information that was uncorrelated with existing beliefs created a unique opportunity to study this question. The large impact of the new safety assessment on auction prices provides direct evidence that experts causally influence consumer demand.
The second important marketing question addressed by the findings in this paper is whether consumers are able to ignore information once it is revealed to be incorrect, something that marketing practitioners often wished their consumers would do. Companies are often interested in eliminating negative associations with their brand that resulted from behaviors the company no longer engages in, or in dismissing rumors about their products, or in eliminating beliefs about their products or services which have been contradicted by scientific evidence.
It is commonly believed, by both the lay public and marketing researchers, that people are unable to ignore information once they have received it. A very large experimental literature, briefly reviewed in the next section, provides evidence that supports such belief.
The findings in this paper, the first examination of this question outside the lab, provide a very strong counterexample.
EXISTING EVIDENCE ON ADVICE AND CONSUMER DEMAND
In studying the impact of consumer advice on consumer demand this paper is related to a recent marketing literature that has studied the impact of word-of-mouth on demand (see e.g. Boatwright, Basuroy, & Kamakura, 2007; Chevalier & Mayzlin, 2006; Godes & Mayzlin, 2004 , 2009 , and to an economics literature that has studied the impact of providing expert quality assessment on consumer choice (Cutler, Huckman, & Landrum, 2004; Jin & Leslie, 2003; Leemore & Dranove, 2005; Pope, 2009) .
In relation to these literatures the present study provides a more fine-grained dependent variable and a simple identification strategy. The dependent variable used here consists of individual auction prices and individual bid amounts, rather than aggregate market-share or sales. The causal effect of the advice, in turn, is identified by virtue of it having been erroneous and uncorrelated with existing information. Previous attempts have identified advice based on discontinuities of the variable on which the advice is based or on the timing of its public release.
The current research is also related to the working paper by (Freedman, Schettini, & Lederman, 2009) , who examine the consequences of product recalls on demand for toys.
Because recalled toys are not available for sale, however, such data cannot be used to estimate demand following negative information, or its retraction, and hence it cannot answer the questions of interest to the present paper.
EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE ON IGNORING INFORMATION
An overwhelming body of experimental evidence suggests that people cannot voluntarily ignore information they possess. Previous work on the Debriefing Paradigm, for instance, has shown that experiment participants receiving false feedback continue to be influenced by it after it has been retracted by the experimenters (Anderson, Lepper, & Ross, 1980; Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975) . Hundreds of studies have demonstrated that numerical estimates are influenced by starting points (anchors), even when these are transparently irrelevant (and hence should obviously be ignored) such as those obtained through a roulette wheel (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) . Hundreds of studies have documented the Hindsight Bias, where people fail to ignore outcomes they have just learnt when predicting the beliefs of uniformed individuals (Fischhoff, 1975) . A few dozen studies have demonstrated the Dilution Effect, where the presence of irrelevant information reduces the weight placed on relevant information even when respondents are asked to judge the relevance of information before making a judgment (Nisbett, Zukier, & Lemley, 1981) . Finally, a large literature has demonstrated that (mock) juries do not successfully follow instructions to ignore inadmissible evidence (for a meta-analysis see Steblay, Hosch, Culhane, & McWethy, 2006 ).
An interesting finding across these and related literatures is that people fail to ignore information even when forewarned about it being invalid (Gilbert, Tafarodi, & Malone, 1993) . Fischhoff (1975) , for instance, in the original demonstration of the Hindsight Bias, used the same stimuli (though different subject populations) in experiments were subjects were and
were not forewarned that they would receive to-be-ignored information. The rate of hindsight bias across both experiments was almost identical: people exaggerated the probability of events whose outcome was known by 36% and 32% percentage points respectively (see experiments 2 and 3). Schul (1993) finds, randomizing forewarning across conditions of the same experiment, that forewarning lead to a (non-significant) increase in the response to invalid information.
While the experimental evidence that people cannot ignore invalid information is overwhelming, the magnitude of this phenomenon in decisions or purchases outside the laboratory has not been assessed.
THE NEW INFORMATION AND ITS RETRACTION
CR publishes a monthly magazine providing "expert, independent and non-for-profit" reviews aimed at aiding consumers' purchase decisions. Product reviews are typically summarized via rankings based on an overall index of quality and/or safety.
Carseats is one of the product lines routinely reviewed by CR. Finally, the archived internet pages of major news websites at the Internet Archive (http://www.archive.org) show that the story also received ample coverage on the web. In cnn.com, for example, the carseat story was one of its 10 most popular ones on January 4 th .
In light of all this, it seems very likely that the majority of carseat buyers learnt of the information of interest from the news coverage it received rather than from CR directly. This is important for two reasons. First, it validates conducting the empirical analyses on short term fluctuations in valuations. Second, it reduces the concern that people buying a carseat after the retraction never were aware of the retracted information. On the one hand, the multiple news sources that so heavily covered the CR story continued to make that information available after the retraction, and on the other, parents a few days away from buying a carseat are likely to have paid attention to headlines referring to carseat safety.
THE AUCTIONS DATA

Source of the Data
The data were purchased from (http://www.researchadvanced.com), an official Data Service Provider for the largest online auction website. 3 The dataset includes all auctions listed in the infant carseat category between three months before and three months after the information was released. As mentioned above, the empirical analyses will focus on auctions for the six carseat models covered by both the 2005 and 2007 Consumer Reports rankings (N=5,471). include all models into the same regressions, dollar variables will be deflated by the average selling price of the corresponding carseat model so that the regression estimates will correspond to percent changes in prices rather than dollar changes (as will be shown below, the results are robust to various alternative operationalizations of the dependent variable).
Descriptive statistics
The auction site offers sellers the option to pay additional fees to add special features to their listing (e.g. an additional photo, bold font, etc.). The total count of all such features included in a listing is employed as a control in the price regressions; across all models the average number of paid features is quite similar. Auctions can be set to last 3,5,7 or 10 days, the mean in the sample was 5.2 days and it does not vary much across carseat models.
The new/used status is known for about 75% of listings. For the remaining 25% the items' descriptions were used to infer it. For 7.5% of listings this was not possible and hence the price regressions include both a "New" and a "Used" dummy, with unknown as the omitted category.
The 5,471 auctions in the sample were listed by 2,825 different sellers. The four sellers with the greatest volume listed 18.7% of all auctions, while 62% of sellers listed a single carseat auction. A total of 9,248 bidders participated in these auctions, 72% participated in exactly one and only 6% in four or more. Given the small number of repeated observations per bidder, and the endogeneity involved in participating in more than one auction, conducting within bidder comparisons before and after the information shocks is not practical.
Although bidders are allowed to retract their bids, doing so is quite rare. Furthermore, the retraction rate was very similar in the two weeks prior to the release of the 2007 Consumer
Reports' ratings (M = 0.51%), the two weeks they were considered valid (M = 0.48%), and the two following weeks (M = 0.44%), χ 2 (2) = .13, p = .93.
Key Predictors
For the empirical analyses that follow, a key predictor will be an auction's ending date.
Comparisons will be made for auctions ending before the information was released, while it was considered valid, and after it was retracted. These time periods will be referred to as Given that a natural experiment is behind the data generating process, all analyses are reduced-form in nature; further structural assumptions are not needed to identify the effects of interest.
Impact of information shocks on final prices
The impact on final prices is assessed with two complementary approaches. More specifically, the following equation for auction i of carseat-model k was estimated:
(1) Price i,k / Avg.Price k =β 0 + β 1 *During i + β 2 *After i + β 3 *∆Ranking k + β 4 *During i *ΔRanking k + β 5 *After i *ΔRanking k + γ*controls i,k
Where Avg.Price k is the average selling price of carseat model k.
If bidders responded to information while it was valid, then β 4 <0 (indicating that prices are lower when a carseat drops in the ranking). If people stop responding to information once it is retracted, then β 5 = 0.
Because ΔRanking varies at the carseat-model level rather than at the auction level (note the k subscripts), standard errors are clustered by time*carseat-model, leading to 18
clusters. The regressions were estimated including observations from auctions ending between three weeks before the new ranking was released and three weeks after it was retracted to focus on variation from the relevant period. For robustness these regressions are also estimated for larger time windows (5 weeks and 3 months for both before and after periods).
The results are presented on Table 2 . Columns 1-3 show OLS results for auctions receiving at least one bid, while columns 4-8 present results from Censored Regressions Models which include all auctions, treating those with 0 bids as 'censored' at their starting price. 4 The point estimates of interested are displayed in bold.
Column 1 presents the base specification, controlling only for item attributes.
β 4 = -.028, indicating that for every position lost in the ranking, the estimated price change during the two weeks in which such ranking was considered valid was a drop of 2.8% (on average carseats moved 4 positions, so the average effect is around an 11% price change).
Consumers, in other words, did respond to the new information provided by CR.
In contrast, β 5 is very close to and not statistically different from 0 (β 5 = -.001, p = .93), indicating that after the new ranking was retracted, it no longer influenced auction prices.
Columns 2 and 3 add controls for auction-level attributes and for competition. The resulting point estimates of interest are similar to those of Column 1. ***Table 2 *** Column 4 reports the results from a censored regression, where auctions with no bids are treated as left-censored (at the starting price) and auctions sold with the buy-it-now option as right-censored (at the buy-it-now price). Importantly, shipping charges are unknown for unsold auctions and hence neither the dependent variable nor the censoring point include them.
The censored regression, therefore, improves on one shortcoming from the OLS regression (selection into sale) but introduces a new one (measurement error in the dependent variable).
Qualitatively, the censored regression results are aligned with the OLS ones: β 4 <0 and β 5 ~ 0. The results from Columns 5 and 6 are very similar to those from Column 4, indicating that the point estimates are robust with respect to the time windows employed.
Columns 7 and 8 estimate the regressions separately for new and used carseats. As was pointed out by an anonymous referee, we may expect the effect of the information to be larger for new carseats because people are often advised not to buy used ones and hence consumers buying used carseats might be expected to be less prone to following advice in general, and CR's in particular. 5 The effect of the new information is in fact estimated to be much larger, and is only statistically significant, for new carseats.
Robustness. A variety of robustness tests were performed on the previous results.
(1) Clustering. Rather than clustering errors at the model-time level (18 clusters) they were clustered at the model level only (6 clusters) and not clustered at all (standard OLS errors). For every column in Table 2 the standard errors for β 4 were largest when clustering by model-time (see supplemental materials for full set of alternative standard error estimates).
(2) logs. All columns from Table 2 were re-estimated using the log of price as the dependent variable. The point estimates for β 4 were quite similar. About -3% in columns 1-3, about -7% in columns 4-6; for new carseats it was -8.9%, and for used ones -2.1%. All the estimates are significant at the 1% level except the used-carseats one which was not significant at the 10% level. None of the point estimates for β 5 are significant at the 10% level.
(3) Out-of-sample average price. Rather than computing the dependent variable as the ratio of the selling price to the average selling price of the carseat model during the whole sample, it was computed instead based on the average selling price up to four weeks before the information is released. For columns 1-4 this means that the dependent variable is computed based on a hold-out sample. The correlation between the original dependent variable and the one based on previous prices is extremely high (r = .99) so not surprisingly the resulting point estimates barely changed: β 4 equals -.029, -.024, -.026 and -.034 in columns 1-4 respectively, all significant at the 5% level, while β 5 equals .000, .004, .002 and -.013 respectively, none significant at the 10% level.
How fast did consumers respond?
The regressions from Table 2 make discrete comparisons of Before with During and
After. In order to assess how quickly consumers responded to the release and retraction of information, regressions with a more fine-grained measure of time are needed. To this end, time was split into three-day-intervals and the interaction of the resulting three-day dummies
with ΔRanking was used to study price dynamics more closely (the sample is not dense enough to allow an even finer measure of time). In particular, the four carseat models that dropped in the rankings of the flawed report experienced a price drop in the During period, while the two carseats that gained in the ranking saw a price increase. This general concern with natural experiments is amplified in the current context because the multiple products studied are substitutes and because buyers and sellers can observe the actions of others when making decisions. While standard errors were clustered in the price regressions to account for this fact, the number of clusters (18) may have been insufficient to properly address the problem (Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 2004) .
This subsection seeks to further address the issue of independence. It does so by treating two-weeks worth of data as an observation, leading to just 14 observations, and assessing how 'unusual' the two-weeks of interest (when the information was considered valid) are in relation to the other two-week periods (biweeks) in the data.
Note that by using such a long period of time as an observation, any remaining lack of independence would reduce rather than enhance the odds of documenting marked changes in prices following the release and then retraction of information, and hence leads to a conservative test of the hypothesis of interest.
Let's begin with the price regressions that employ the interaction of the time dummies
with ΔRanking as the key predictors ( Table 2 ). The specification from Column 3 was reestimated but now interacting ΔRanking with biweekly dummies rather than During and After.
The results for the roughly six months of data are plotted on as that depicted in Figure 3 , is observed on other biweeks. That is, we want to examine how often the four carseat models that dropped in the ranking experience a negative price shock, and the other two a positive one.
To answer this question a 1/0 indicator was created for each biweek*carseat estimate.
The indicator equals 1 if the carseat experienced a price change in the same direction as that predicted for the During period, and 0 otherwise. By adding up this indicator variable across the six carseats for each biweek, we have a count of how many models moved in the predicted direction (a sum of 6 indicates that all models had price shocks in the direction predicted for the During period).
Across other biweeks this variable ranged between 1 and 5 (M = 2.5, SD=1.24). That is, on an average biweek, 2.5 of the 6 carseats experienced a price shock that matched the direction predicted for the During biweek. The (perfect) prediction of 6/6 price changes obtained in the During biweek (and in no other biweek) is hence 2.8 standard deviations more accurate than the typical biweek. This further suggests that the patterns documented above are very unlikely to have been caused by sampling error.
Does everyone succeed at ignoring the retracted information?
While the evidence presented above suggests that consumers were able to ignore invalidated information, that they did so for every carseat model, and that they did so promptly, the results rely on closing prices and hence depend primarily on auctions' marginal bidders. It is possible that a large portion of consumer do fail to ignore the invalidated information, but just not enough of them to influence final prices. This is particularly relevant given that (Camerer, Loewenstein, & Weber, 1989) find, in a lab experiment, that the hindsight bias is attenuated in a market context because those least affected by it trade more.
To address this possibility I estimated regressions similar to those presented above but with bids rather than auctions as the unit of analysis. For the purpose of learning about bidders across the full range of valuations, "quantile regressions" for bids in the 20%, 40%, 60% and 80% percentile were estimated. A quantile regression is analogous to a standard linear regression but instead of maximizing fit for the average value, it does to for a given quantile (see Koenker & Bassett, 1978; Koenker & Hallock, 2001) . Intuitively, rather than assessing how did the new information influence the average bid, it estimates how much it influenced bids around the 20% percentile, say, of amount bid. While it is probably incorrect to treat bid amounts as maximum willingness to pay (Zeithammer, 2010) , it is more reasonable to presume that changes in willingness to pay lead to changes in bid amounts.
The point estimates and bootstrapped standard errors for these quantile regressions are reported on Table 3 . For all four quantiles examined, During*ΔRanking is estimated as negative and significant while After*ΔRanking is not statistically different from 0. This is consistent with bidders across the range of valuations having responded to the new ranking only while it was valid. ***Table 3***
Comparing the point estimates across columns, the effect size of the new information appears larger for the higher quantiles, but this is mechanically true as lower amount bids necessarily have smaller effects (expressed as percentage of final prices). If one deflates the point estimates by the bid amount of the corresponding quantile, the effect sizes are much more similar: -1.7%, -2.5%, -2.4% and -2.0% for the 20%, 40%, 60% and 80% quantiles respectively. In short, the evidence is consistent with bidders across the full range of valuations having first responded to the new information and then succeeded at ignoring it upon its retraction.
Seller Behavior
Considering that many sellers are individuals in this market (recall that 62% of listings were posted by sellers offering a single auction in the sample), it is possible that at least part of the effects documented for final prices are driven by the actions of sellers (e.g., by parents selling their now thought to be unsafe carseats).
To assess the potential role of sellers, Figure 5 reports results analogous to those of The first finding answers perennial questions that marketing researchers and practitioners have great interest on such as: Do third party reviews causally influence demand?
Do consumers respond to safety information regarding products? These questions are often difficult to answer convincingly because recommendations and safety ratings are not exogenous, they are correlated with other information held by consumers, and hence correlation between the reviews by third parties and demand cannot be interpreted causally.
The natural experiment studied here, where new information was all but random, provides a rather conclusive answer to these questions: yes.
The second finding, that people were able to fully discount information once retracted, also has high relevance for both marketing researchers and practitioners. Marketers frequently encounter situations where they wished consumers would ignore invalid information. For example, companies are often interested in eliminating negative associations with their brand (e.g. "American cars are unreliable"), dismissing rumors about their products (e.g. 'the food sold at that restaurant is made from mutant chickens') 7 , or eliminating wrong beliefs that have been debunked by scientific studies (e.g., 'drinking coffee while pregnant leads to fetal development problems') 8 .
It is commonly believed, by both the lay public and decision making researchers, that people are unable to ignore information once they have received it. The findings in this paper provide a very strong counterexample. Below I discuss possible explanations for this reversal.
While future research should examine the relative importance of these explanations, the present findings do invite us to reconsider what the experimental literature predicts regarding the ability of people outside the lab to ignore information.
Why was information ignored here but not in the lab?
Previous experimental studies suggest that the facts that (1) Consumer Reports provided a substantive and compelling instruction to ignore the retracted information, and (2) that consumers have access to additional information regarding carseat safety, are both likely to have facilitated consumers' ability to ignore the retracted information.
Research studying (mock) jury decision making has shown that while juries fail to follow instructions to ignore information when the reason to ignore it is procedural (e.g., an
incriminating audiotape was obtained without a warrant), they do successfully ignore information when the reason to ignore it is substantive (e.g., an incriminating transcript was obtained from a barely audible audiotape). See e.g. (Kassin & Sommers, 1997) . Similarly, recent research on the debriefing paradigm finds that if subjects are told the feedback they received in the experiment should be ignored because the test used to generate it is fake, then subjects do succeed at ignoring such feedback (McFarland, Cheam, & Buehler, 2007) .
These findings suggest that part of the reason behind subjects' inability to ignore invalid information in experiments is that they do not consider the to-be-ignored information as irrelevant as the experimenters believe it should be. The fact that Consumer Reports gave a substantial and compelling reason to ignore the safety information is likely to have contributed to the success consumers had in ignoring it.
Another factor that may have contributed to successfully ignoring the retracted information is that consumers were able to (and probably did) pursue additional information upon learning that the information they had was no longer valid. Consumers desiring to obtain additional information could consult consumer reviews on various websites (e.g.
Amazon.com), earlier assessments by Consumer Reports ® , safety ratings conducted by other agencies, etc. Existing research has shown that considering alternative outcomes reduces both the hindsight bias (Arkes, Faust, Guilmette, & Hart, 1988; Slovic & Fischhoff, 1977) and anchoring (Chapman & Johnson, 1999) . It has also shown that being able to physically eliminate irrelevant information attenuates the dilution effect (Kemmelmeier, 2004) . This suggests that in settings where consumers are free to pursue additional information and to more easily dispose of unwanted information, something they typically cannot do in a lab setting but can easily do outside of it, they will be more likely to successfully ignore information.
More broadly, the findings from this paper highlight the importance for lab research to explicitly set out to explore the impact that moderators likely to be present outside the lab have on findings obtained in the lab. In the context of studying people's ability to ignore information, for example, lab studies have not allowed subjects to obtain additional information, postpone the decision or physically eliminate the irrelevant information. They also have not systematically manipulated (with the exception of the mock jury evidence reviewed above) the nature of the credibility of the source falsifying the information. Because all these variables differ in the field vs. the (existing) lab evidence, carefully manipulating them in future research would be useful to deepen our understanding of the external validity of existing lab research on this topic. Note: Each dot in the figure is a point estimate of ΔRanking*biweek-dummies from regressions with price as the dependent variable (similar specification to Column 3 in Table 2 ). Biweeks before/after new information % change
Number of carseats % new
Note: Each dot in the figure is a point estimate of ΔRanking*biweek-dummies from regressions with numbers of biweekly auctions for a given model, and the % of these that are new, as dependent variables, with biweek*model as the unit of observation (N=14*6=84)
